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After reading this article you will learn about the relevance of history for social research.
A group of thinkers, during the relatively brief period in which social science has been recognized as a disciplined form of intellectual endeavour, has tried to effect a rigid differentiation between what are conventionally known as social sciences, like sociology and economics on the one hand and history on the other, in terms both of their logic and method.
They have argued that history is basically an ‘idiographic discipline’, whereas the social sciences, generally, are ‘nomothetic’ ones.
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Definitionally, an idiographic such as history is concerned with the unique and particular events or happenings that are studied for their own sake, while the nomothetic disciplines like sociology are concerned with the unique and particular events or happenings that are studied for their own sake, while the nomothetic disciples like sociology are concerned with the unique and particular events or happenings that are studied for their own sake, while the nomothetic disciplines like sociology are concerned with the formulation of general principles through which the class of phenomena constituting their subject-matter is sought to be understood.
It is this dichotomous view of sciences which has quite often been referred to by the group of historians, social scientists who would jealously want to maintain some clear line of demarcation between their respective fields.
The main argument has been supplemented by two further derived distinctions between these disciplines. It is held, for instance, that the sociologist in his quest for general propositions about social systems, of necessity, must develop conceptual schemes so as able to analyse and order the many diversities of human existence in society.
The historian, so runs the argument, concerned as he is with the individuals and events in their particularistic detail, has little, if any, use for such conceptual schemes of generic applicability. In essence, the sociologist and the historian are conceived of as working on different levels of concern for abstraction.
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To trace the example further distinction between the two disciplines as brought out by the group of thinkers espousing the dichotomous view, concerns the role played by the dimension of time in the two disciplines.
The historian, on this view, is engaged in tracing a chronological sequence of the past events, showing how one event led to another, while, say the sociologist by contrast, is mainly interested in the functional relationships which exist between analytically distinct elements in social systems, time notwithstanding.
The sociologist is seen as seeking general propositions not bound by temporal or spatial contexts, i.e., timeless and space-less.
Yet another argument in the ultimate analysis to the same end, is advanced mainly by sociologists who are keen on guarding their rather ‘newly acquired status’ as scientists and to the effect that history and sociology are in the conduct of their inquiries.
The sociologists according to this view, follow the methods of the hard core sciences while history does not, and for most part cannot aspire to this because of the very nature of its subject matter. It has to make do with methods that can afford only qualitatively inferior findings.
However, drawing strict lines of demarcation between History and Sociology (as a social science) as has been .done both by a group of historians as well as sociologists, may involve considerable difficulties. Nagel has convincingly shown that the distinction between the idiographic and nomothetic disciplines is one which, in the ultimate analysis, can scarcely be maintained.
It is hard to appreciate how in a purely idiographic discipline one could acquire knowledge of anything at all. On the other hand, in a nomothetic discipline any consideration of the singular, particular or non-recurrent can hardly be avoided.
Any attempt to distinguish between history and sociology on methodological grounds is similarly fraught with hurdles; for this would imply that sociology would have to be virtually restricted to the study of present-day societies, here and now. This would result in the scope of the discipline being defined by reference to a particular set of research techniques.
The arguments advanced in favour of a strict demarcation between history and sociology would thus be seen to have rather alarming implications for the sociologists’ appreciation of the uses of historical data in their own fields of research.
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If sociologists adhere to the view that history and sociology are logically or methodologically distinct, they understandably would be inclined to have a low estimation of the significance of history for their fields of study.
Admittedly, for a sociologist considering the major task of sociologists as a class, the building up of a general theory of social systems based on logically ordered body of abstract categories, the historical materials in general may not seem to be of much value. They may, of course, be of a particular interest to him in just one respect, viz., in connection with the dynamic aspects of his purported general or trans-historical theory.
It is not difficult to see that data secured through conventional methods of the historian having a continuity over time, are required to develop and test general propositions about the process of long-term social change.
In fact, as Hans Genth says, “History consists of changes which social structure undergo.” Each change, each emerging as philosopher Whitehead noted, “is… containing within itself all its past and seed of its future.”
Smelser’s study entitled ‘Social Change in the Industrial Revolution,’ testifies, in unmistakable terms, to how well historical data may be employed by a sociologist interested in testing the general propositions about the process of long-term social changes.
Smelser uses a great deal of data from the industrial and social history of Lancashire covering a period of over seventy years commencing from 1770, with a view to providing an empirical test of general theory of change in social systems through process of structural differentiation.
The theory is a part of the wider theory of social action developed by Talcott Parsons. The procedure that Smelser followed was to show how his model of structural change could be successfully applied to change:
(a) In the Lancashire cotton industry and then, to change,
(b) In the family economy of the Lancashire working class, concretely two different institutional sub-systems. Both the sub-systems, Smelser argues, conform to the same pattern of structural differentiation and the process of change, in both cases could be explained in terms of a common dynamic model.
Thus, Smelser claimed the general applicability of the model and corollariously of the general theory of action from which the model was derived. In this manner, Smelser utilized the data of history as a useful type of material to inject content into his trans- historic theoretical scaffold.
He was not interested in the Lancashire cotton industry or the working class family for their own sake, nor even in the context of some broader theory of the industrialization process, rather, he was interested in this simply because they provided data that could be used in testing a general theory of social systems.
For Smelser, historicity of the two sub-systems was of no consequence. For the group of sociologists which stresses the basic methodological difference between history and sociology the historical data have a still meagre significance as compared to what they may have for the sociologists dealing with theories of general scope.
While this group may accord some recognition to the general orientation value of the general orientation value of the broad historical studies for sociologists (for, who can deny the strong historical base underlying the sociological thinking of Marx, Weber and Durkheim) the conventional historiography is regarded as a representation of some prescientific mode of thinking about man and society which is clearly outclassed in the study of contemporary societies conducted with the aid of ‘modern’ research techniques.
For them, the empirical basis of much historical argument is suspect. Lazarsfeld has criticized in strong terms the sweeping assertions so often made by historians without an adequate empirical basis.
These methodological purists would not, as far as possible, make use of the conventional type of historical materials even in connection with the study of social change; they would rather create their own kind of historical data using techniques like panel study. Only thus, would argue, can the data of a quality affording fruitful theoretical analysis be obtained.
Besides, the afore-mentioned two groups of sociologists for whom relevance of historical data is little more than marginal, exists a major group representing what may be called the ‘classic’ tradition. This group takes on an entirely different stand vis-a-vis the relevance of history for social research.
This tradition stems from the faith that the study of history is one of the most important sources of sociological data. Sociological inquiries following this tradition are characterized by a focus on different forms of structure and culture exhibited by particular societies at specific points of their development or evolution and on the understanding of particular processes of change delimited in geographical and historical terms.
This group of sociologists, operates, to use Wright Mills’ phrase, at the level of social-historical structures. The great masters of the classic tradition in sociology, to name only the most outstanding, are Karl Marx, Max Weber, Herbert Spencer, Mannheim, Schumpeter, Mosca, Michels, Veblen, Hobson and C. Wright Mills.
The perspectives of the ‘classic’ sociologists are decidedly far wider as compared to the perspectives of sociologists who would let the modern methods of field research define for them the scope of their subject.
The classic tradition in sociology may thus be seen as occupying an intermediate place in the continuum of the various inquiry types that constitute modern sociology. Sociologists of this tradition neither aim at an entirely general theorizing nor would they be happy with mere empirical descriptions of social milieu at certain point in time.
The central concern of those of the ‘classic’ tradition is with comprehending the diversity which is manifested in the structure and culture of societies, with identifying the limits and determinants of this diversity and with explaining how given societies or structure within them have developed in a particular way and function the way they do.
This implies thinking in terms of societies developing structures and as such would call for the introduction of a historical dimension. Thus, the special relevance of historical data for sociologists of this schools is easily appreciated.
Obviously any developmental approach cannot do without historical materials. When one speaks of a change from folk society to a modern society or from the informal to formal organization of production or business, he is using in effect, the conceptions which derive their validity from historical study.
The comparative method, fundamental to the classic tradition draws its breath from history. The approach consists in comparison being drawn between different societies with the view to explaining the variation in social structure and culture. Such comparison involves or must involve, in principle, the societies of the past as well as of the present.
The exponent of the comparative method cannot afford to neglect the vast fund of information about man and society which the past has to offer, regardless of whatever materials are available about the contemporary societies. For him, history is the broadest and probably also the richest field of study.
According to the classic tradition, sociology in effect is nothing short of a historical discipline and the problems of its concern cannot be approached or fruitfully formulated without adopting a historical perspective and an extensive utilization of historical data.
Thus, the classic tradition refuses to admit of any clear demarcation of any kind between history and sociology. They are seen as inextricably inter-wined or as merging imperceptibly, one into the other. This tradition would regard the differences between them as differences of degree only, not of kind.
The above discussion affords a cognitive back-drop for the issue of the relevance of history for sociological studies.
There are on the one hand, sociologists who take the ‘Natural science view’ of sociology, whatever their focus of interest; formulation of a general theory or empirical social research by use of quantitative techniques, and there stands on the other hand, a strong group, committed to the classic tradition and operating at the level of social-historical structures. For the former, the relevance of history to sociological studies is just about negligible or marginal, whereas for the latter, sociology is inevitably rooted in the study of history.
The former claims that a true science of society must be able to transcend history, both in theory and methods, while the latter argues that history will not be transcended. As Marx said, “… real history, history as temporal order, is the historical succession in which ideas, categories and principle have manifested themselves … it is the principle which (makes) history, and not history… the principle.”
They (the latter) question the value of both of the attempts to establish trans-historical theory and of the detailed empirical studies of social milieu that typically ignore the societal and historical contexts.
Although the., merit of this controversy (which has gradually died down in recent years) is rather difficult to evaluate, it may be said with a certain measure of conviction that it will not be worthwhile either for the methodological purists to exclude them from the map of the sociological discipline and such studies as do not come up to the arbitrarily decreed methodological standards of validity and precision nor for that matter will it be desirable for the ‘classic’ traditionalists to deny the relevance of quantitative methods current in social researches on consequential sociological problems.
The real import of the argument arises over questions of how the sociologists of the present generation may best direct their efforts and resources. No one can deny that studies on the ‘classic’ lines are of crucial significance to contemporary sociology and should be pursued enthusiastically, in the larger interest of the subject.
Any proposed general theory must understandably take into active account the range of possible variations in human societies, especially, of the ways in which they are integrated and change. The Parsonian general theory has been criticized on the score that it is not as general as it purports to be; that is, certain variations or exceptions manifested by some societies have suffered neglect in his theoretic scheme.
It hardly needs to be overemphasized that studies of the historical and comparative kind fulfill the function of operating as frameworks into which detailed empirical studies of social millieu can be fitted in meaningful way.
The most rewarding procedure would be to study with the help of modern research techniques particular social millieu which seem to have a particular significance in the context of some wider structural analysis.
It is easy to appreciate also that studies focusing on patterns of variation in social structure or on what is taken as ‘human-nature,’ can be a great aid in understanding our own society and the times we live in. Comparisons with other historically diverse settings typically help us understand our setting more intelligibly. Hence, the tradition of historically oriented study would continue to form the very core of sociology.
During the past few decades the importance of historical perspective has been largely recognized by the rival camp representing the ‘natural science view of society.’ In fact, this quarter of sociologists had to face a barrage of criticisms from within the discipline itself. Increasingly critical positions have been taken toward both the ‘general theory’ and methods of survey-research in recent years.
The value of structural-functional theory operating on the premise of social system has been seriously questioned. While the recent years have shown significant advances in the equipment of quantitative analysis, the validity of the data subjected to such analyses has come under searching examination.
The outcome of these developments according to Goldthorpe is that the concept of social action has assumed a new centrality, both from the methodological and theoretical standpoints. The need to explain social structure in terms of action and interpret the meaning of action has once again become the major preoccupation of sociological analysis.
With this development, the void between the perspectives of the historians and sociologists has lessened considerably, and once again the possibility of a meaningful mutual dialogue between the two disciplines, typical of Max Weber’s time, has come close to materialization.
The previous decades witnessed the development of new forms of social history (or ‘urban’ history) built from large bodies of quantitative data secured from such sources as official registers, trade directories and census reports, etc. There is thus no real basis now, for marking off historians from sociologists by reference to the kinds of data with which the two work and the way they utilize them.
The historians in having to handle such data (social history) are being required to lean heavily on the techniques of analysis developed, in the main, by sociologists. They also have to depend on sociological concepts which they have now started appreciating. Reciprocally, the new social history has important functions for sociologists.
The demonstration of historical data as of a systematic and quantitative breed as apparent in the new social history has encouraged sociologists to use such materials for testing specific hypotheses involving quantitative comparisons.
The new social history is thus a welcome augury for sociologists to undertake empirical investigations of certain theories of the middle range relating to the long-term effects of a certain process on other institutional mechanisms and processes.
The contemporary sociology is characterized by a renewed interest in the macro-sociological and evolutionary or developmental perspectives and it is precisely this development that calls for a cautious and critical stance toward historical data. Especially, sociologists seeking to work in the classic tradition need to be aware of the need to adopt historical data from the secondary sources with a pinch of salt.
It is apparent that writers of this tradition who cried hoarse against ‘positivistic’ sociologists banking entirely on survey-based data are themselves exhibiting a measure of dogmatism in treating the ‘facts’ contained in historical works as self-evident truths rather than understanding them chiefly in the nature of inferences of the historian drawn from the ‘relics’ at his disposal.
Any kind of historical sociology relying in the main on the secondary historical sources needs to apply the screws of critical scrutiny in the same manner as methodologically required for the quantitatively oriented sociology.
Certain versions of present day sociology utilizing the evolutionary or developmental approach seems to reveal a measure of uncertainty in regard to the relationship between historical and theoretical statements.
The objective in such studies is the well-intended exercise of demonstrating empirically, on the basis of historical evidence, certain sequential patterns in institutional or structural change. But the procedure of tracing historical patterns post-factum, cannot by itself lead to theoretical explanation.
A theoretical explanation entails a separate exercise. There are in evidence some recent attempts to produce ‘theoretical’ history, i.e., theories of social evolution or development which purport to represent the principles underlying sequential regularities and thus, afford estimations about the future.
Such attempts are reflected clearly in the works of the ‘new’ Marxist writers like Perry Anderson and have been shown to be present, albeit covertly, in a bulk of current American writing on the modernization and industrialism themes.
In the latest work of Parsons an attempt of this order is discernible (revivification of structural functional theory by linkage with a pro-naturalistic evolutionism). In all such attempts there is according to Goldthorpe, a tendency to ignore the reasoned criticisms directed against the notion of theoretical history by writers like Karl Popper and Gellner.
The authors of this methodological lineage, according to him, seek in “the classic historicist fashion, to use their theories to lend a spurious scientific basis and objectivity to what can be shown to ideological arguments.”
Theories of social evolution and development according to Robert Nisbet, are typically ‘haunted’ by the problem of how to make the historical record congruent with the proposed immanent processes of change.
A keener awareness of the historical record and the way it is constructed would stand the sociologists in good stead, since such an awareness may be expected to sensitize them to the treacherous spots that may lie concealed in the evolutionary theories as a class.
Thus, while agreeing with Arthur Schlesinger that “No social scientist can wisely ignore the long arm of the past” we need not agree with Daniel Webster that “the past is, at least secure.” The axiomatic belief about the past being secure may lead one to treacherous conclusions. A critical and cautious stance vis-a-vis the historical materials is, on all counts, most desirable.