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In this article we will discuss about the views of various sociologists on religion.
Emile Durkheim on Religion:
The sociological theory of religion, which Durkheim developed in his book The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, was inspired by Marx’s celebrated idea that the social existence of men determines their social consciousness. Durkheim does not, however, keep himself limited to socio-economic relationships. He goes beyond socioeconomic relationships to include other social relations.
In this book Durkheim presented what is probably the most influential interpretation of religion from a functionalist perspective. Durkheim argues that all societies divide the world into two categories: ‘the sacred’ and ‘the profane’.
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More simply, this means the distinction between the sacred and the non-sacred. Religion, according to him, is based on this distinction. It is “a unified system of beliefs and practices related to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden”.
He insists that ‘sacred things’ do not simply mean those personal things which are called gods or spirits. Anything can be ‘sacred’, such as a pebble, a piece of wood, a rock etc. This is not the particular quality of the pebble or the wood which makes it sacred.
Sacred things are considered to be sacred simply because they are symbols of something. Durkheim, therefore, says that to understand the role of religion in society, the relationship between these symbols and that which they represent must be established.
He argues that if one can study the most rudimentary forms of social existence and the thought forms which accompany them, then perhaps one can understood the relationship or connection between the symbol (i.e., collective existence) and that which the symbol represents (i.e., collective representations). It is for this reason that the various primitive groups of Australia and North America form the basis of his study.
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Durkheim considers the religion of Australian aborigines, which he calls totemism, as the simplest and most basic form of religion. The totemic object among these people is connected not only with religion but also with its membership.
Aboriginal society is divided into several clans. A clan is like a large extended family with its members sharing certain duties and obligations. Each clan has a totem, usually an animal or a plant.
The totem is a symbol. It is the emblem of the clan. “It is its flag; it is the sign by which each clan distinguishes itself from all others”. The totem is, however, more than this, it is a sacred symbol. The totem is the outward expression of the totemic principle or god. The totem, being thus a religious or sacred object, inspires respect and awe.
Specially is this true when the otherwise scattered parts of the clan come together periodically on a ceremonial occasion. It is then that an excitement is bred which lifts the individual out of himself. It is a minor case of creative synthesis. The totem is only an object; yet it is symbolic of a reality unseen. The ‘images of the totemic beings are more sacred than the beings themselves’.
This fact makes it evident that the totem has a special symbolic significance. Because it symbolizes the moral unity of the clan as a whole, it is sacred and eventually transforms itself into a divinity.
Durkheim argues that if the totem “is at once the symbol of the god and of the society, is that not because the god and the society are only one”? Thus, he suggests that in worshipping god, men are in fact worshipping society. Society is the real object of religious veneration.
How does man come to worship society?
Durkheim argues:
“Primitive man comes to view society as something sacred because he is utterly dependent on it”.
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Society is more important and powerful than the individual. But why does man not simply worship society itself? Why does he invent a sacred symbol like a totem?
By way of explanation, Durkheim argues:
“it is easier for him to visualize and direct his feelings of awe toward a symbol than towards so complex a thing as a clan”.
He sees this as a situation in which religion “ceases to be an inexplicable hallucination and takes a foothold in reality. In fact, we can say that the believer i^ not deceived when he believes in the existence of a moral power upon which he depends and from which he received all that is best in himself: this power exists, it is society”.
In the Australian tribes studied by Durkheim, the totem is represented in various ways. Each totem has its emblem or blazon. In almost all clans, there are objects, such as pieces of wood, stones, etc. which bear a figurative representation of the totem. Ordinary objects, which are referred to as churinga, are transfigured once they bear the emblem of the totem.
They share the sacred quality that is associated with the totem, a phenomenon which we can easily understand by observing ourselves. In modern societies, the flag may be regarded as the equivalent of the churinga of Australian aborigines.
The flag of a collectivity shares the sacred quality which we attribute to the native land. Totemic objects, bearing the emblem of the totem, give rise to behaviour typical of the religious order, i.e., either prescriptive or proscriptive practices. The members of the clan must abstain from eating or touching the totem or the objects which share the sacred quality; of the totem.
Or, they must display with regard to the totem some explicit form of respect. In this way, there is formed in the Australian societies a division into two fundamental categories of the whole of reality: the sacred and the profane.
For Durkheim, the “sacred and the profane have always and everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in common”. There is a logical chasm between the two domains, and it is precisely the totality of sacred beliefs and practices which constitutes a religion.
Religion is a group phenomenon, for it is a group which gives a religion its specific character and unity.
Moreover, the religion unifies the group; literally, it binds men together. In this way, Durkheim emphasises his general thesis that religious ideas are derived from society and serve to bind the members of a society together. This essential and positive function of religion—viz., solidifying a society—explains why it is a ubiquitous and permanent institution.
Durkheim’s ideas on religion are influential. These have, however, been subjected to several criticisms. It is argued that he was wrong in accepting totemism as a religion. He is also criticised on the ground that religion does not imply worship of society.
It is pointed out that Durkheim’s ideas are more relevant to pre-literate, simple societies in which “there is a close integration of culture and social institutions”, and in which “work, leisure, education and family life tend to merge, and where members share a common belief and value system”.
Durkheim’s ideas are not wholly applicable to modern societies “which have many sub-cultures, social and ethnic groups, specialised organisations and a range of religious beliefs, practices and institutions”.
He ignores the fact that in more complex societies religious beliefs and practices vary from one stratum to another and that these strata have conflicting conceptions of the “same” religious doctrine. It is also striking that he fails to see the negative, alienating consequences of religion.
Bronislaw Malinowski on Religion:
There are striking similarities in approach to religion between Durkheim and Malinowski. To begin with, Malinowski bases-his thesis on religion on data collected from small-sized non-literate societies in the Trobriand Islands off the coast of New Guinea in the same way as Durkheim draws on the activities of the Australian aborigines for his thesis on religion.
Second, like Durkheim, Malinowski sees religion as reinforcing social norms and values and promoting social solidarity.
There is, however, one difference of a basic nature between the two. Unlike Durkheim, Malinowski “does not see Religion reflecting society as a whole, nor does he see religious ritual as the worship of society itself”. On the contrary, Malinowski identifies specific areas of social life with which religion is concerned. These areas are situations of emotional stress which threaten social solidarity.
In his handling of science, magic and religion, Malinowski accepted essentially the traditional Western conception of the dual reality-namely, the reality of the natural world, grounded in observation and rational procedures that lead to mastery over nature, and supernatural reality, grounded in emotional needs that give rise to faith.
For example, Malinowski derived science not from magic but from man’s capacity to organize knowledge, as demonstrated by Trobriand Islanders’ technical skills in gardening, shipbuilding, etc. In contrast, he treated magic, which co-existed with these skills, as an organized response to a sense of limitation and impotence in the face of danger, difficulty and frustration.
Again, he differentiated between magic and religion by defining magical systems as essentially pragmatic in their aims and by defining religious systems as self- fulfilling rituals organized, for example, around life crises. It is also significant that he differentiated between the individual character of religious experience and the social character of religious ritual.
Anxiety and tension tend to disrupt social life. Situations which produce these emotions include ‘crises of life’ such as birth, puberty, marriage and death. Malinowski notes that in all societies these life crises are surrounded with religious ritual.
He looks upon death as the most disruptive of these events and observes:
“The existence of strong personal attachments and the fact of death, which of all human events is the most upsetting and disorganizing to man’s calculations, are perhaps the main sources of religious beliefs”.
Religion deals with the problem of death in the following manner:
“A funeral ceremony expresses the belief in immortality, which denies the fact of death, and so comforts the bereaved. Other mourners support the bereaved by their presence at the ceremony. This comfort and support checks the emotions which death produces, and controls the stress and anxiety which might disrupt society. Death is ‘socially disruptive’ since it removes a member from society. At a funeral ceremony the social group unites to support the bereaved. This expression of social solidarity re-integrates society”.
In addition there are also events which produce emotional stress and strain, tension and anxiety. Emotional disturbances occur because these events are not amenable to human control or manipulation.
For example, fishing in the high seas by Trobriand Islanders is open to danger and uncertainty. It is dangerous because a storm may result in loss of life. It is uncertain because the catch is dependent on the presence of a shoal of fish which cannot be predicted.
Hence, fishing in the open sea is preceded by rituals to ensure a good catch and protect the fishermen from storm. Although Malinowski refers to these rituals as magic, it is argued by some that these rituals should be regarded as religious practices. Here is an example of a ritual associated with a specific situation which tends to produce anxiety.
Rituals reduce anxiety by providing confidence and a feeling of control. Fishing rituals, like funeral ceremonies, are also social events. The group unites to deal with situations of stress, and the unity of the group is thereby strengthened.
The distinctive contribution of Malinowski to the sociology of religion lies in the fact that he emphasized the role of religion in promoting social solidarity by dealing with situations of emotional stress that tend to threaten the stability of society.
Karl Marx on Religion:
Karl Marx looks upon religion as an illusion which is necessary for the alleviation of sufferings of the people in a capitalist society.
In the words of Marx:
“Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature; the sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people”.
Obviously, therefore, religion would completely disappear in a communist society where there would no more be division of people into classes, the oppressor and the oppressed, the exploiter and the exploited. In other words, communism would usher in a situation in which the social conditions which produce religion would disappear. Religion has therefore, no place in a communist society.
The ways in which religion can mitigate the pain of oppression may be briefly noted.
First, it promises a life of eternal bliss in the afterlife, i.e., life after death. Pain becomes bearable when people have something better to look forward. Second, there are religions which extol the virtues of poverty and even of suffering produced by oppression.
The well- known biblical quotation brings this out dramatically:
“It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven”. The implication is clear. Those who would bear the deprivations of life with dignity and humility will be rewarded for their virtue.
Third, religious teachings persuade men to hope for supernatural intervention to solve the problems on earth. Fourth, religion often teaches man to bear with injustice and accept the social order, however ‘iniquitous it may be.
In Hinduism and in many other religions, the social order is represented as a handiwork of the Creator and, as such, social stratification is inevitable with all its inequitable concomitants. Interpreted thus, the social order is immutable and unchangeable. The people have, therefore, no other alternative but to accept stoically their position in the social order.
From a Marxian point of view, religion not only serves to create a series of myths which justify and even rationalise the social order based on injustice and exploitation, but it also serves as an instrument of that oppression.
Historically, all organised religions have received patronage from the ruling class and in exchange these religious leaders have diverted attention of their followers from the real source of their oppression and thereby have helped the ruling class to remain in positions of power.
There is ample evidence to establish many of the charges leveled by the Marxists against organised religion. But will religion completely disappear in a situation where there would be no exploitation of one class by another? There are many aspects of life which are unpredictable and uncertain.
Death, for example, creates void which no amount of logic can close. In situations such as this one, people naturally raise questions about the meaning of life. Religion gives them the required emotional support and security. During the Second World War, Russian men and women in thousands thronged in and around the churches to say prayers for the well-being of near and dear ones who were in the thick of the battle.
“One estimate places the number of baptized Orthodox Christians in the period 1947-57 at ninety million which is roughly the same as in 1914. Religion in Russia is not simply a hangover from pre-communist days. Despite official disapproval a number of small religious movements such as the Baptists and Evangelical Christians continue to spring up”.
It has, therefore, been very aptly said that “these examples suggest that there is more to religion than a set of beliefs and practices which develop in societies based on the private ownership of the forces of production”.
Religion and Secularisation:
It should be borne in mind, however, that the dysfunctional aspects of religion relate to institutionalised religion. Instead of strengthening social solidarity, organized religions have served all throughout historical period as divisive forces, encouraging directly and indirectly religious feuds of varying dimensions.
The functions and dysfunctions of religion with respect both to society and to individuals may be examined with reference to the most outstanding social and cultural development of the last several centuries: namely, the secularisation of culture.
In primitive and traditional societies, religion was all pervasive in the sense that religion ordained everything from birth to cremation or burial, including even mundane matters, such as occupational groupings. In short, religion determined the world-view of the believers.
These characteristics are applicable to religious people in modern societies also. But a subtle difference has crept in. With regard to theology, people are gradually moving away from mythical interpretation to a more rational one. The “rationalisation of religious thought is part of a general process of the rationalisation of thinking in general”.
Secularisation of culture involved not simply an increase in rationality in the thinking of men, but also “a diminution of the sacred” which is often characterised as “desacralisation” (some sociologists term it as “desacrilisation”) of the attitude toward persons and things.
Desacralisation (or desacrilisation) actually means “the withdrawal of the kind of emotional involvement which is to be found in the religious response, in the response to the sacred”.
Thus, the secularisation of culture, combining both desacralisation and rationalisation, means that a religious world-view is no longer the basic frame of reference for thought. Another view of the world as no longer sacred and composed of things to be manipulated comes into existence. This view more and more crowds the religious world-view into the sphere of ‘private’ experience and becomes the mode of thought in the ‘public’ sphere
Max Weber’s interpretation of industrial society provides one of the earliest statements of the desacralisation theme. According to him, the industrial society is characterised by rationalisation and intellectualization and, above all, by the “disenchantment of the world”.
The world is no longer charged with mystery and magic; the supernatural has been banished from society. The meanings and motives which direct action are now rational.
A number of sociologists have accepted Weber’s interpretation of the basis of action in industrial society.
Bryan Wilson observes:
“Religious thinking is perhaps the area which evidences most conspicuous change. Men act less and less in response to religious motivation: they assess the world in empirical and rational terms”.
Wilson identifies the following factors which were mainly responsible for the development of rational thinking and a rational world-view. First, ‘worldly asceticism’ of Protestantism ‘created an ethic which was pragmatic, rational, controlled and anti-emotional’.
Second, in an industrial society men are involved in organisations which are based on rational principles. Examples are firms, public service, educational institutions, government, etc. Naturally, these organisations impose rational behaviour upon them.
Third, modern knowledge is based on reason rather than on faith. “Science”, says Wilson, “not only explained many facets of life and the material environment in a way more satisfactory (than religion), but it also provided confirmation of its explanation in practical results”.
Fourth, the development of ideologies such as communism and organisations such as trade unions offer practical solutions to problems. By comparison, religious solutions, such as the promise of justice and reward in the afterlife, do not produce practical and observable results.
It is obvious that a rational world-view is opposed to religion because the latter is based on faith and as such is non-rational. People no longer interpret the world around them in religious terms. There has, therefore, developed what is called ‘secularisation of consciousness’.
It must, however, be conceded that this represents one side of the picture. We have already seen that there are several ‘life crises’ which are unpredictable and uncontrolled and which leave people completely bewildered, helpless and forlorn.
During such periods they seek comfort and security in religion. This may be non-rational and non- logical, and not at all consistent with their rational behaviour in other walks of life. Such ambiguities and conflicts involved in secularisation of culture are inevitable.