ADVERTISEMENTS:
Universities in India are creatures of the Acts of Parliament/State Legislatures. There are no non-statutory universities; none can be recognised according to the University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956. There are, however, some non-statutory institutions like the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay or the Tilak Maharashtra Vidyapeeth, Pune which are recognised as ‘deemed to be universities’ by the UGC.
The Indian Constitution is federal and the power of governance is divided between the Central Government and the states. There are three lists of legislative power, the Union List on which the Centre alone can legislate, the State List on which the States have the exclusive power of law-making and the Concurrent List on which the Centre as well as the States can legislate.
Education was in the State List until 1976 when by the Constitution (Forty-Second) Amendment Act, it was transferred to the Concurrent List. Now both, the Centre and the States, have power of legislation over education. This power is, however subject to the power given to the Centre by entries 63, 64, 65 and 66 of List I.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
Actually, the transfer of the entry of education from the State List to the Concurrent List was not necessary in view of the fact that the entry 66 as interpreted by the Supreme Court had already ensured great primacy over the power of the states. A state university, Gujarat prescribed Gujarati as the medium of instruction for instruction as well as examinations. A student called Shri Krishna challenged the validity of this regulation on the ground that the medium of instruction was a matter pertaining to standards of education and was, therefore, covered by entry 66 of List I.
The Supreme Court upheld this argument in Gujarat University v. Sri Krishna (AIR 1963 SC 703). State legislature could not confer such power on the University; it fell within entry 66 of List I which dealt with co-ordination and determination of standards of higher education. By adopting a regional language as an exclusive medium of instruction, it was assumed, the standards of education would go down.
This assumption is questionable. Provision of a regional language as an exclusive medium of instruction might impinge on the rights of religious and linguistic minorities to preserve their language or might impose an unreasonable restriction on the right of citizens to reside in any part of the territory of India, but it may not necessarily affect the standards of education.
By holding that medium of instruction was a matter pertaining to standards of education, the Court significantly watered down the State legislative entry on education. If the medium of instruction was a matter within the purview of “coordinating the standards of education”, anything else could be.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
The entry 66 which gave power to the Centre to legislate for coordinating the standards of higher education was read almost as nullifying the entry on education in the State list. The Centre could always intervene under entry 66 to set right the imbalance in the standards of education. (Why should the Court have taken upon itself the function of legislation?)
The Gujarat University Case therefore resulted in substantial curtailment of the States’ legislative power with regard to education. Further, the setting up of the UGC with its power of distributing funds to universities and institutions of higher education and laying down conditions for educational programmes had also shifted the balance of power over education in favour of the Centre.
The forty-second Amendment has, therefore, not made any significant difference in respect of the constitutional position. Now that the Centre has concurrent power of legislation over education, it may be able to lay down a uniform policy of education or may lay down uniform format for University legislation.
Part III of the Constitution guarantees fundamental rights to persons and citizens. The rights are enforceable against the state because Article 13(1) of the Constitution specifically states that the state shall not make any law violative of the fundamental rights. The word “State” has been defined in Article 12 of the Constitution.
That definition as interpreted by the Supreme Court includes all statutory bodies within the meaning of the word “State”.
The universities being statutory bodies are ‘State’ for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution. It means that the universities cannot act in contravention of any of the fundamental rights. These rights can therefore be invoked against all educational institutions set up by statute such as the universities, the UGC etc. and also against government institutions.
In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (AIR 1981 SC 487) a regional engineering college, one of the 15 sponsored by the Government of India but set up by a society registered under the Jammu and Kashmir Registration of Society’s Act, 1898, was held to be “state” because it was “an instrumentality or agency of the government”. In recent years the Supreme Court has expanded the meaning of the word “State” so as to bring many government controlled but apparently non-government institutions within the purview of the fundamental rights.
Statutory bodies such as universities are subject to judicial control because they are amenable to writs such as certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and quo warranto etc. By the extended meaning of the words “other authorities” in article 12, the Court has brought within the amenability of these writs various other educational institutions which function as agencies or instrumentalities of the State.
By inclusion of various educational institutions within the purview of article 12, many fundamental rights can be invoked against them. However, even now there are some loopholes in the Constitution. For example, article 29(2) of the Constitution says that no one shall be denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid out of State funds on grounds only of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
ADVERTISEMENTS:
If a private educational institution refuses admission to a student on any of the above grounds, what is his remedy? He may complain to the education department of the State government and the latter may withhold the grant. But he cannot file a writ petition to enforce his fundamental right against such an institution even if it is receiving aid out of the state funds, because even a broad definition of the word “State” given by the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia case may not help bring such an institution within the purview of article 12.
Another aspect of the constitutional provisions is that while they prohibit discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them generally, discrimination in respect of admission to educational institutions is prohibited only on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. Thus discrimination on the ground of sex is permitted.
This has been purposely provided because of the existence of girls schools and women’s colleges and universities, S.N.D.T., Bombay, for example. Similarly discrimination on the ground of place of birth is permitted. Therefore we have a requirement of domicile for admission to educational institutions. However, any such discrimination has to stand the test of reasonable classification.
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law and the equal protection of law. It has been held by the Supreme Court that differential treatment can be given to a group of people or a section if it is based on reasonable classification. There are two tests of reasonable classification- (i) those who are treated differently must form a group distinct and identifiable from others; and (ii) the differential treatment must be related to the object of the Act. The Supreme Court, in my opinion, did not apply this test correctly in D.P. Joshi v. Madhya Bharat (AIR 1955 SC 334) where it upheld a rule requiring non-residents of Madhya Bharat to pay capitation fee for admission to a medical college.
The Court pointed out that since the word “residence” was not mentioned in article 15(1) or 29(2), discrimination on the basis of residence did not come within the prohibition of that article. This was rather too legalistic an approach.
Such discrimination ought to have been struck down by the Supreme Court under article 14 of the Constitution on the ground that payment of capitation fee as a differential treatment had no nexus with the object of providing admission for residents of Madhya Bharat. The state might have reserved a substantial number of seats for its residents or even could have gone to the extent of excluding nonresidents from admission. But what was the justification for imposing capitation fee on nonresidents?
In Pradeep Jain v. India the Supreme Court rightly expressed its disagreement with D.P. Joshi decision, but it went to the other extreme. It laid down a rule requiring admissions to post-graduate courses in medicine to be given on the basis of all-India entrance examinations. This rule is impracticable which is obvious from the fact that though it was given in 1984, it has yet not been brought into effect.
Moreover, all-India unity does not mean uniformity. Regional needs in a vast country like India ought not to be under-estimated. A poor man would be better off if his son/daughter could secure admission in a neighbourhood medical college. An abstract right of equality of admission to any medical school is hardly of any consequence to him.
In fact, one more glaring lacuna of the Constitution is that while it prohibits discrimination on grounds such as religion, race, caste, sex etc., it does not forbid discrimination on the ground of financial incapacity. There is therefore denial of education to so many because of their poverty.
The educational system must compel the rich to pay more for their education while providing adequate scholarships and financial assistance for the deserving but destitute students. It is rather unfortunate that in socialistic India there are not as many opportunities for the poor but brilliant students to get education as there might be in some of the capitalistic countries.
The Constitution allows the State to make special provision “for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes” Under this provision, seats are reserved for the scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes and the backward classes in educational institutions.
The device of compensatory discrimination was used by the Constitution as a means of ameliorating the lot of those who had suffered from the historic caste disabilities. While the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are delineated by the President by an order, the backward classes are determined by the State governments.
Provision for compensatory discrimination came into the Constitution through the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951. It was a sequel to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (AIR 1951 SC 226) in which the Court held that the community-wise reservation of seats in a medical college was contrary to article 15(1) and 29(2). The amendment was enacted for the purpose of enabling the State to discriminate in favour of the weaker sections of society.
In Balaji v. Mysore the Supreme Court laid down a rule that at no time shall the number of reserved seats exceed more than 50% of the total number of seats. The Court also pointed out that backwardness should not be determined by caste alone, though caste was bound to be an important factor. Besides reservation of seats, the government helps the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and backward classes by granting remission of fees, scholarships and permitting higher age limit etc.
It is yet not known how far and what impact these facilities have made on the social and educational backwardness of these backward groups. There are some ill effects of the reservation policy; for instance, there have developed certain vested interests in backwardness. Even forward groups make efforts to get classified as backward for the purpose of obtaining these facilities.
Furthermore, the elite among the S.C. and S.T. gets totally alienated from their caste/social group. The facilities are absorbed by the better-off sections among the scheduled castes/tribes. On the other hand, reservations have created tension in a society where already career opportunities are scarce. We cannot dispense with the reservation policy for quite some time but a review of its working from time to time is necessary.
The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion subject to certain exceptions. India being a secular state, no religious instruction can be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained out of state funds. However, an educational institution, which is administered by the State but, has been established under any endowment or trust, which requires that religious instructions shall be imparted, may impart religious instruction.
However, no person attending any educational institution recognised by the State or receiving aid out of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in such an institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such an institution unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian, has given his consent thereto. These provisions ensure that educational institutions do not impose any religious instruction or worship on a pupil.
The minorities have been given certain rights in the cultural and educational sphere. Any section of citizens residing in the territory of India or any part thereof having a distinct language, script or culture of his own shall have the right to conserve the same. All minorities, whether based on religion or language, shall have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
The Constitution further imposes two specific restrictions on the State in respect of the right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The first is that while making any law providing for the compulsory acquisition of any property belonging to a minority educational institution, the State must ensure that the amount fixed by or determined under such law for the acquisition of such property was such as would not restrict or abrogate the right guaranteed under the constitution.
It may be a slight deviation, but a necessary one, to state that under the Constitution, as it was before the 44th constitutional amendment, private property could be acquired by the State on payment of an amount which, according to the Supreme Court, was not illusory, though much less than the market value of that property. The Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, has deleted article 31 and a new provision requiring that no one shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law was enacted as Article 300-A.
The minority educational institutions are therefore in a very privileged position. Their properties cannot be acquired except on such terms as in the view of the Court would not amount to restriction or abrogation of their right to administer the institution. The clause has so far not been judicially interpreted because no action interfering with the property of the minority educational institutions has been taken anywhere.
But it would be almost forbidding for the State to acquire the property of an educational institution belonging to a minority because it would have to pay as much compensation as would be needed for the reconstruction of such property.
The second limitation on the State’s power is that it cannot, in granting aid to educational institutions, discriminate against any educational institution on the ground that it is under the management of a minority, whether based on religion or language. This means that the government cannot impose such conditions for its grant-in- aid as would result in restriction of the minorities’ right to establish and administer an educational institution.
The constitutional rights of the minorities have been extensively interpreted by the Courts. The minorities have two rights—(i) to conserve their distinct language, script or culture and (ii) to administer and establish educational institutions of their choice.
The second right is not qualified by the first which means that the right to administer and establish educational institutions is not confined only to such institutions as provide for conservation of their distinct culture or language. Further, a minority institution does not cease to be such if a large number of its students do not belong to that minority. In fact, article 29(2) compels it not to refuse admission on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them.
It has been held that the right of the minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice could be restricted in the interests of education but not in the interests of the general public. Restrictions such as the optimum number of students in a class, qualifications of teachers, conditions of service of teachers etc. were valid because they were in the interests of education but restrictions which had the effect of curtailing the power of administration of a minority could not be imposed.
A right to administer cannot be a right to mal-administer. Therefore, the right to administer an institution can be subjected to conditions for ensuring orderly, efficient and sound administration, but these conditions should not destroy or take away the right of the minorities to establish and administer institutions.
For example, a provision requiring the governing body of every college to include among its members a representative of the University nominated by the Vice Chancellor and representatives of teaching and non-teaching staff and of the college students was declared inapplicable to minority institutions because it displaced the minority management and entrusted it to a different agency.
It would be unconstitutional for the government to supersede the managing committee of a minority institution and appoint an ad hoc committee instead. However, the Court has upheld a University statute which required the managing committee of a college to consist of the principal and one member of the college staff in order of seniority by rotation.
The principal was an important functionary in a college and was an appointee of the management. He was not a stranger to the college. The same could be said about a member of the staff to be appointed in order of seniority by rotation. The Supreme Court had held invalid the inclusion of outsiders by the management but in this case it was the inclusion of the insiders which was held to be valid.
Selection of a teacher is an essential element of administration. Accordingly, a condition that any appointment of a teacher in a college would be subject to the approval of the Vice Chancellor has been held to be invalid under article 30(1). The board of management of a Jesuit school appointed a junior teacher, a Jesuit, as the head master of the school in preference to the senior-most teacher who was not a Jesuit.
The Director of Education reversed the appointment order and upheld the claim of the senior teacher. The High Court quashed the Director’s order and upheld the appointment made by the management on the ground that the post of the head master being of pivotal importance, the right to select him was an important aspect of administration and the management’s right must be unrestricted. A rule requiring that the senior-most teacher must be promoted to the head master’s post could not be binding on the minority schools.
It has been held that while fair procedure can be laid down for disciplinary actions against employees, the final power to take such action must vest with the minority management without being subject to any outside control. Thus a provision making penalty imposed on a staff member subject to the Vice Chancellor’s approval was held invalid. Similarly where a college teacher against whom disciplinary action had been taken could move the university syndicate and the latter could order his reinstatement, the provision was held to be violative of Art. 30(1).
As a result of such judicial decisions, a disparity between minority educational institutions and other institutions has developed. The minority educational institutions have been able to successfully challenge many regulations whose aim was to impose University control over the management’s power in respect of its staff.
There has unfortunately been a vicious circle in the field of education. There has been a growth in governmental power and consequently reduction in the autonomy of the educational institutions. The governmental intervention has however been invited by the teachers and employees who feel that their management has been rather oppressive. Only the minority educational institutions have been able to remain free from such governmental control by invoking their educational rights given by the Constitution.
The University legislation usually lays down the powers and functions of various authorities of the University such as the Senate, the Academic Council, the Executive Council, the Board of Studies or the Faculty etc. Obviously, these authorities and even officers like the Vice Chancellor are bound to act within the ambit of the powers given to them by the law.
There has been a great increase in the scale of litigation involving the universities. Universities are more often the defendants in such cases.
These cases usually fall into the following categories:
(a) Those concerning students, their education, reservation of seats for weaker sections of society, examinations, malpractices in examinations etc.
(b) Staff appointments, dismissals, punishments, departmental actions, transfers etc.
(c) Elections to various bodies of the University, and
(d) Matters involving contracts, civil and criminal liability or matters involving claims from other parties as to the lack of power or failure to follow the proper procedures on the part of the University authorities.
A good deal of case law has now grown which consists of interpretation of the University Acts, rules, regulations etc. Universities pass statutes which are in the nature of subordinate legislation. University authorities are required to take disciplinary action in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Universities being statutory bodies have to act strictly within the four corners of the statute and their actions can be challenged as being ultra vires. Educational institutions also might enter into contracts or own properties and litigation concerning those also might take place.
The most celebrated case which involved an action against a student for using unfair means at an examination is Board of High School and Intermediate Examination v. Kumari Chitra Srivastava and others (AIR 1962 SC 1110). It was held that cancellation of the results of three examinees for having resorted to unfair means without even giving them an opportunity to be heard was illegal.
However, at an examination, mass copying was alleged to have been done and therefore the Board cancelled the entire examination and asked the candidates to appear again, the action was upheld and no opportunity of being heard was held necessary. Here there was no stigma against a particular person. The action was not by way of punishment directed against some specific individuals.
The courts are usually reluctant to interfere with matters of education. Hira Nath Mishra v. Rajendra Medical College is an example of judicial restraint in educational matters. There were complaints that molestation of girl students had taken place. The police could not be called because if an investigation had been started, the female students would not have cooperated out of sheer fright and fear of harm to their reputation.
For similar reasons, a regular tribunal could not be set up because the girls would have been afraid of giving evidence. Therefore, the Principal of the college appointed an enquiry committee of three independent members of the staff. The Committee called the girls privately and recorded their statements. Thereafter, the students named by them were called. The complaint against them was explained, the written charge was handed over and they were asked to give their statements in writing. The committee after considering these statements made a report.
The validity of the action against the concerned students was challenged on the ground that the girls were not examined in the presence of the students or a copy of the report of the committee was not given to them.
The Court held that “under the circumstances of the present case the requirements of natural justice were fulfilled. The procedure adopted by the College authorities was right and the only way of providing a just and reasonable…………..inquiry without exposing the women students to harassment”.
In Maharashtra, Gujarat etc. college tribunals have been set up for dealing with service matters of the college staff (S. 42 A(i) of the Poona University Act.) (All references hereafter to the same Act). At present the jurisdiction of the tribunal is restricted only to matters of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. It would be better if the jurisdiction of the tribunal were extended to other penalties also. Further, there is a need to provide such a judicial body for the University staff also. The present tribunal has no jurisdiction over the University staff.
The decisions of the college tribunals are final and no appeal lies over them to the courts. However, a writ petition can be made against the decision of the tribunal to the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution on grounds such as lack of jurisdiction, error of law apparent on the face of the record or violation of the rules of natural justice. The very purpose of such a tribunal is to do quick justice and to be informal and cheap. Lawyers cannot appear before the tribunal except with the permission of the presiding officer of the tribunal.
At present the presiding officer of the tribunal need not necessarily be a judge. He may be a person who has been a Principal of a college. In practice, however, the government has appointed men with judicial experience as presiding officers. The tribunals must be just and fair but they must not be over legalistic.
The tribunal must keep the interest of education in view while dealing with such cases. The Law Commission of India has proposed such educational tribunals at the national and regional levels. A hierarchical structure of such educational tribunals could go a long way in providing a deprofessionalised dispute settling mechanism for universities, colleges and schools.
Teachers of universities and colleges have now formed their associations. Their bargaining power vis-a-vis the government is always weak as compared to other trade unions. The Supreme Court had held that universities and educational institutions were “industries” for the purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A Bill to exclude them from the definition of “industry” is at present on the anvil. It is unfortunately true that the governments—Central as well as State—have given less than fair treatment to teachers.
Their scales are revised last and that too reluctantly. Even when the revision comes, the Central universities get them quickly but most State governments drag their feet. Even the 1973 revision has yet not been given in some states. The 1986 revision remains distant. Teachers are not always free from blame. But to treat them in such a cavalier manner is no solution. It demoralises the teaching community. In the universities, very few persons of high eminence are seen nowadays and if university education continues to get such a raw deal, academic excellence will be eliminated altogether.
There is nothing wrong if teachers ask for higher emoluments. There must be a permanent organisation for revising their scales of pay from time to time. If teachers are given adequate emoluments with better facilities for research and study, it will indeed be a good investment in human resource development.
Another problem of University administration is the increasing government control over the universities. Although University autonomy is talked about very often, through various devices, it is undermined. Today a university in Maharashtra cannot appoint even an additional clerk or a peon without the permission of the government.
One should read the following section of the Poona University Act to get an idea of the sweeping government control over the Universities:
Section 77-B:
Without the prior approval of the State Government or an officer authorised by it in this behalf, the University shall not:
(a) Create any new posts of officers, Teachers or Employees;
(b) Revise the pay, allowances, post-retirement benefits and other benefits of its Officers, Teachers and other Employees;
(c) Grant any special pay, allowance or other extra remuneration of any description whatsoever, including ex-gratia payment or other benefits having financial implications, to any of its Officers, Teachers or other Employees;
(d) Divert any earmarked funds for any other purposes; or
(e) Incur any expenditure on any development work.
Similarly the following section which gives power to the government to prescribe a code laying down duties, workload, pay, allowance etc. of the staff of the University:
Section 77-A:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the State Government may, for the purpose of securing and maintaining uniform standards, by notification in the Official Gazette, prescribe a Standard Code ‘providing for’ the classification, manner and mode of selection and appointment, reservation of posts in favour of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes’, duties, workload, pay, allowances, post-retirement benefits, other benefits, conduct and disciplinary matters and other conditions of service of the Officers, Teachers and other employees of the University and the Teachers and other employees in the affiliated Colleges and Recognized Institutions (other than those managed and maintained by the State Government).
When such a code is prescribed, the provisions made in the code shall prevail, and the provisions made in the statutes, ordinances, regulations and rules for matters included in the code shall, to the extent to which they are repugnant to the provisions of the code, be void. However, such government controls come only because the universities abused the freedom given to, them.
Some universities increased their staff inordinately and ultimately imposed a very heavy burden on the State exchequer. Almost all universities are funded by the government. Some unpopular measures like revision of the fee structure might be necessary if expansion of education without sacrifice of quality is to be achieved.
These are a few examples of government control over the universities. There are many other provisions in the Act which make deep inroads into university autonomy and thereby adversely affect their working. Statutes made by the University Senate require the assent of the Chancellor.
Clause (5) of Section 38 of the Poona University Act clearly mentions that “no statute passed by the Senate shall be valid or shall come into force unless assented to by the Chancellor”. The Chancellor may give or withhold his assent or refer the Statute back to the Senate for consideration. [S. 38(4)].
Many statutes are held up for want of such assent for years. If the University wants to start a new faculty, the name of the faculty has got to be included in the relevant statute. Similarly, the Boards of Studies in various subjects of that faculty have to be mentioned in another statute. Therefore, even after a decision to start a faculty is taken, it cannot start functioning until the relevant statutes are approved by the Chancellor. It takes at least a year and a half to get the assent of the Chancellor.
We can give a number of such examples of bureaucratic delays which come in the way of legitimate academic pursuits. The Poona University Act lays down that the University funds could be invested only in certain types of securities. It is to be found that even investments in public sector industries, which fetch higher interests, are not permitted by the present legislation.
The provisions of the law are often used so as to frustrate their real intentions. This is done by hair splitting of words and by distorted constructions. We have some examples of this. Section 29 of the Poona University Act provides for a Board of Studies for each subject. The Board is to consist of the heads of departments from various colleges, and the head of the University department in the subject, if any.
The Board consisting of these heads has to co-opt three persons “who have specialised knowledge of the subjects and who are not in that University” and two persons “from amongst the teachers who are not Heads of Departments”.
The purpose of this provision is to have association of experts from outside the University and also of the teachers of the University other than the heads of departments. Since the Act does not define the words “specialised knowledge” they are those whom the majority of the eleven members chooses to call so. This provision is used for packing the Board with yes-men. A person who had been nominated as a head of the department in a college continues to be a member and if elected as Chairman or Dean continues to be a Chairman or Dean even though he has ceased to be a teacher of that college.
This happens because the relevant section says that the term of office of the members shall be three years. A person who is neither a teacher nor has any academic background or interest can get himself co-opted as a member of the Board and can be sent to the Faculty on behalf of such a Board since the Board can send the Chairman and four members to the Faculty. Once he is in the faculty, he can get elected as a Dean. The Dean is an ex-officio member of the selection committee for selecting lecturers, readers and professors for the University departments and is also a member of the committee which appoints examiners.
Through Boards or Faculties, people manage to get into the Executive Council, which is the apex decision making authority of the University. It was observed that cliques and alliances of professional election manipulators to capture these decision making bodies were formed. Power was concentrated in the hands of such people and they often used such power for rewarding the loyal and punishing those who did not fall in line. Their hold on the election process enabled them to get elected again and again. Perpetuation of power in such hands led to abuse of power and perversion of university, autonomy.
The Government of Maharashtra recently enacted amendments to the Maharashtra Universities Act which imposes ceiling of six years on the tenure of membership of the University bodies such as the Senate, the Executive Council and the Academic Council and so on. This is however, only a short-term remedy. A more comprehensive legislation which would provide for greater participation of teachers, students and academics in the decision making process of the Universities must be enacted. Another defect of the present legislation is that it provides for too much electioneering.
Many good teachers are therefore left out of the decision-making bodies as they cannot get elected. Unfortunately the caste and various other corrupting elements influence the elections and keep out good academics from the decision-making processes. Teacher organisations as well as student organisations have become mere trade unions without any regard for their academic roles. Students are used by corrupt university politicians for their personal ends. There are professional muscle men masquerading as student leaders who are willing to use terrorist methods for achieving their ends.
We have very perverse electoral politics in our universities. It is a miniature of our national politics where formal compliance with the letter of the law outweighs compliance with the spirit of the law. The remedy will not be to restrict the participation of teachers and others in the decision-making as was contemplated under the Bill introduced by the government some time ago. Ultimately no legislation can really provide for a clean and healthy university life unless those who operate the university are committed to certain values.
The more elaborate the laws the greater are likely to be the leeways in them which can be used for causing distortions. Life cannot be governed by written law alone. It must obtain its substance from conventions, which really give content to democracy. Now that we are planning to give a fresh look to education, it is necessary to think along these lines.
Good conventions will grow when we make this system more accountable by fixing responsibility on various constituents such as teachers, students and educational managers, provide greater academic freedom, greater participation of teachers in academic decision-making, reduce emphasis on external examinations which encourage rote learning and also provide greater freedom to the universities from government control. Conferment of autonomy on institutions might be a step in the right direction from that point of view.